ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have a large number of sensor nodes to detect events, and base stations (BSs) to collect the sensing data in sensor fields [1] [2] [3] [4] . A sensor node operates sensing, computing, and wireless communication modules. When a real event occurs, the node detects it and produces a report to cause its BS to notice it. The BS collects the forwarded report via multiple hops, and provides event information to users through the Internet or communication infrastructure. Although the nodes are suitable for a random distribution in an open environment, they are compromised due to their hardware resource restrictions. In addition, they are exposed to various malicious attacks due to environmental constraints. False report injection [5] [6] [7] and false vote injection attacks consume needless energy and block report transmissions in the sensor network. Thus, the network's lifetime is reduced and it is impossible to collect sensing information. Figure. 1 shows the false report injection attack and the false vote injection attack in the sensor network. These attacks compromise sensor nodes, and false votes are produced by the compromised nodes. In the false report injection attack, the compromised node injects a false report without detecting an event. If the false report with false votes arrives at the BS, intermediate nodes consume unnecessary energy resources for the transmission of the false report. In the false vote injection attack, the compromised node injects a false vote into a legitimate report to be dropped in an intermediate node. If the legitimate report is dropped due to the false vote, the BS does not receive the report information. Thus, energy consumption and report transmission are damaged by the two attacks in the sensor network.
In order to deal with these two attacks, Li et al. proposed a probabilistic voting-based filtering scheme (PVFS) [8, 9] . While forwarding the report, this method determines one of the attacks based on the number of false votes detected in the report. If the number of detected false votes exceeds a threshold, the report with the false votes is filtered out in an intermediate node against the false report injection attack. In the method, if the number of detected false votes is less than the threshold, the report is forwarded to the BS against the false vote injection attack. Therefore, the PVFS detects the false votes in intermediate nodes against the false report and false vote injection attacks.
In this paper, we propose a method to select the next hop node in order to improve energy savings based on a fuzzy logic system. In the proposed method, before a node forwards a report to its next hop node, the node considers the next hop node's factors (energy, distance, and time) and selects a relevant next hop node. Therefore, the proposed method improves energy efficiency through the selection of effective next hop nodes as compared to the PVFS.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the PVFS and the motivation behind it. The proposed method is described in detail in Section 3. In Section 4, the experimental results of the proposed method are analyzed and discussed. The conclusions are given in Section 5.
BACKGROUND
In this section, we introduce the PVFS in Section 2.1, and the motivation for the proposed method in Section 2.2.
PVFS
Li et al. proposed a PVFS to detect false report injection attacks and false vote injection attacks. The PVFS consists of three phases: key assignment, report generation, and en-route filtering. In the key assignment phase, the BS distributes keys to every cluster. In the report generation phase, a node produces a report with the votes as an event occurs. In the en-route filtering phase, selected verification nodes detect false votes generated by compromised nodes. Figure. 3 shows the report generation phase which sends event information to the BS. When an event occurs in a cluster, the normal nodes in the cluster forward their vote to the CH. The CH randomly selects a defined number of votes to produce a report. Before forwarding the report, the CH determines the verification nodes through a probabilistic calculation based on their distance. For example, as the hop of CH2 is 2, the probability is 2/4. The verification node verifies the votes of the report. Fig. 4 shows the en-route filter phase while forwarding the report from a source CH to the BS. After determining the verification nodes, the report is forwarded along a path toward the BS. CH0 randomly selects five votes when the votes are collected from the normal nodes (we assume the number of votes is 2). CH0 then transmits the report to CH1. CH1 detects false Vote:s1. CH1 transmits a report to CH2. CH2 doesn't have a verification node to transmit a report to CH3. CH3 filters out the report after false Vote:s3 was detected. The reason for this is that report =2 has been reached.
Motivation
A PVFS was proposed to detect false report and vote injection attacks in the sensor network. In the PVFS, before forwarding a report, a source CH determines the verification nodes through a probabilistic calculation based on their distance. The report is authenticated in the verification nodes along a constructed path. However, the PVFS does not consider the energy resource of a next hop node while transmitting the report. In addition, the report is transmitted along the constructed path in the initial phase. In this paper, the proposed method effectively selects verification nodes for improving energy efficiency based on a fuzzy logic system. In the proposed method, intermediate nodes select one of two next hop nodes through the fuzzy logic system. Thus, compared to the PVFS, the proposed method enhances energy savings while maintaining security power.
PROPOSED METHOD
In this section, we describe the assumptions, the operational process, and the fuzzy logic system of the proposed method for effectively selecting next hop nodes.
Assumptions
In this paper, we assume that sensor nodes (e.g., MICA2 mote) [4] are deployed by using a cluster-based model in the sensor field [10] [11] [12] . The sensor nodes are uniformly spread and fixed. Each node has unique ID and location information through the GPS module. A CH is elected in a cluster, and it is more powerful than a normal node. When a report is generated, a source CH transmits the report downstream to the BS. In addition, an adversary compromises nodes in order to launch false report and false vote injection attacks after distributing the sensor node in the sensor field.
Overview
We propose a method to select the next hop node based on a fuzzy logic system. In the fuzzy logic system, the input factors are the remaining energy, hop count and operating time. The output value represents the quality condition of the sensor node. A CH selects its next hop node according to the next input factors. Fig. 5 shows that intermediate CHs use the fuzzy rule-based system to select the next hop node. When an event occurs in a cluster of CH0, CH0 produces a report with the votes to send it to the BS. CH0 then determines the next hop node according to the conditions of the next node. Thus, our proposed method selects next hop nodes by using the fuzzy rule-based system while forwarding the report. 
Fuzzy Logic System
We apply the fuzzy logic system [13, 14] to effectively determine the next hop node for a verification node. The input factors for the fuzzy logic are the remaining energy, hop count, and operating time of the node in the sensor network. The next section will describe these factors in detail.
1)Input factors
This section discusses the factors that are used for fuzzy inference.
1-1)
Remaining energy is a very important part of the sensor network. If a sensor node has many computations for transmission, reception, and verification, the sensor node quickly destroys its energy resource. Therefore, the remaining energy of the sensor node is important for the network lifetime extension of WSNs.
1-2)
The hop count is the distance from a node to the BS. If a CH has many hop counts, a large amount of energy will be consumed in intermediate CHs. Thus, this factor needs to decrease for the energy savings of the sensor node considering the vote verification.
1-3)
The operating time is the history of when a sensor node is used. When the sensor node selects the next hop node, the history of the sensor node is important.
2)Fuzzy Membership Functions and Rules
This section presents the membership function of the fuzzy logic input factors. The labels for the fuzzy variables are as follows: In R0 (Rule 1), E is LOW, H is SHORT, T is LESS and Q is VERY_LOW. This means that the case values for the condition of the sensor node are very low. In other words, the quality of the sensor node is 0 to 0.3. In case R26 (Rule 26), E is UPPER, H is LONG, T is OODLES and Q is VERY_HIGH. In other words, the quality of the sensor node is 0.6 to 1.0. Figure 8 .Example of proposed method Figure. 8 shows an example of the proposed method. In the sensor field, when an event occurs, the source CH selects the next hop node from the two next hop nodes. The next hop nodes transmit the condition to the CH based on a fuzzy logic system. The CH selects the next hop node with a high condition, and transmits a report to the next hop node. The next hop node verifies the votes in the report after the report is received by the CH. The existing proposed method inefficiently uses the energy resources of the sensor nodes due to the selection of a fixed verification node. Therefore, we propose a method to select the next hop node based on a fuzzy logic system for conserving the energy resources of the sensor node.
Example of the next hop node selection

EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this study, a simulation was performed to compare the proposed method with the existing PVFS. In the simulation, the sensor field size is 1500☓1000 , where 6,000 sensor nodes are randomly distributed. Each sensor node randomly selects a key partition from a cluster. The sensor node consumes 16.25 μJ to transmit and 12.5 μJ to receive, per byte [15] . In addition, it consumes 15 μJ to generate a vote. The size of an original report is 36 bytes [16] , and the vote size is 1 byte. Fig. 9 shows the energy consumption when false votes occur at a rate of 10% to 100 %. Figure 9 . Energy consumption Figure 9 shows the energy consumption of the PVFS and the proposed method. The proposed method has to minimize wire traffic when the next hop node is selected. In the simulation results, the proposed method improves the energy by about 11% more than the PVFS. Figure. 11 shows the network lifetime. We measure the amount of sensor node energy. In the simulation results, the proposed method had a better network life efficiency than the PVFS. The proposed method is extended about 3 rounds in the network life.
CONCLUSION
A WSN is vulnerable to attacks such as false report and vote injection attacks. In order to detect these, a PVFS was proposed to detect false reports or false votes as events occur in the sensor networks. The original method filters out the fabricated votes through keys in the verification nodes selected based on their distance. Although this method simultaneously detects the two attacks in the sensor network, it does not consider the energy resources of the sensor nodes as reports are transmitted to the next hop nodes. In this paper, the proposed method selects the next hop node for improving the energy savings of the node based on a fuzzy logic system. In the proposed method, the three input factors in the fuzzy logic system are the remaining energy, distance, and time. These factors evaluate the conditions of the next hop node to effectively transmit the report. The report is forwarded along a changing path to the BS based on the conditions of the next hop node. Thus, the proposed method saves energy resources because effective next hop nodes reduce the amount of wireless communication. As shown in the experimental results, the proposed method enhances the energy efficiency by an average of 11% as compared to the original method. In the future, we will study the security threat of WSNs by applying various routing protocols and security countermeasures in the sensor network.
